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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT

Why a State-Level Carbon Tax Can Include Border Adjustments
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske

David Gamage is a professor of law at Indiana
University Maurer School of Law and Darien
Shanske is a professor at the University of California
Davis School of Law (King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on SALT,
the authors continue their series on the use of tax
policy to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. They
argue for state-level carbon taxes with border tax
adjustments — an argument that goes against the
general consensus that such a move would violate
the dormant commerce clause.
Introduction
This is our third in a series of articles considering
taxation and greenhouse gas mitigation. To date, all
state-level attempts to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions by placing a price on carbon have involved
cap-and-trade regimes. In our previous two articles,1
we considered how importing tax features into a capand-trade regime could ease distributive concerns and
also make cap-and-trade regimes more efficient.

1David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Using Taxes to
Improve Cap and Trade, Part I: Distribution,” State Tax Notes,
Jan. 12, 2015, p. 99; and Gamage and Shanske, “Using Taxes to
Improve Cap and Trade, Part II: Efficient Pricing,” State Tax
Notes, Sept. 5, 2016, p. 807.

As we noted in our first article, the general
consensus among economists and other commentators
is that a carbon tax would (theoretically) be superior to
a cap-and-trade regime. However, there is also a
general consensus that a single state cannot
(practically) impose a significant carbon tax because a
single state cannot impose border tax adjustments.
Border tax adjustments are crucial because a
carbon tax in one state would make products in that
state more expensive, particularly energy-intensive
products such as concrete. Thus, if consumers or
businesses could just import those products from other
states, a carbon tax in one state would accomplish little
except to harm that state’s domestic industries.
That problem could be solved if a state could
impose a surcharge on out-of-state imports to make up
for the tax on domestic producers. But the general
consensus is that this sort of surcharge would clearly
violate the Constitution’s dormant commerce clause,
effectively taking that solution off the table.
Nevertheless, in this article and in the one that
follows, we will argue against that general consensus.2
Specifically, we will explain how a well-designed statelevel carbon tax with border tax adjustments could
pass constitutional muster.
To be sure, this is both the worst of times and the
best of times for a state to consider imposing a carbon
tax. It is the worst of times because there is little
prospect that a successful state carbon tax might, once
so proven, then soon be adopted at the national level.
Indeed, there is unlikely to be much — if any —
pressure on the states to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions from the federal government.
Yet it is also the best of times because the likely
absence of federal action makes state action more
important, both substantively and symbolically. In
other words, because the federal government will not

2Many of the arguments in this article first appeared in

Shanske, “State-Level Carbon Taxes and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Can Formulary Apportionment Save the
World?” 18 Chapman L. Rev. 191 (2014).
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3Eduardo Porter, “Earth Isn’t Doomed Yet. The Climate

Could Survive Trump Policies,” The New York Times, Nov. 30,
2016, at B1.
4Id. and Michael Grunwald, “Environmentalists Get a Dose
of Good News,” Politico, Nov. 18, 2016, available at http://
politi.co/2g3ziq9.
5Strictly speaking, carbon dioxide is only one form of
greenhouse gas — that is, it is only one kind of the type of gas
implicated in causing global warming. As will be noted below,
we will not assume that the carbon tax imposed by a state
would be only on carbon. However, we will follow Gilbert E.
Metcalf and David Weisbach by labeling that tax a carbon tax
even if it applies to other gases as well. Metcalf and Weisbach,
“The Design of a Carbon Tax,” 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 499, 500
(2009). The tax in British Columbia, for example, is assessed
only on carbon. David G. Duff, “Carbon Taxation in British
Columbia,” 10 Vt. J. Int’l L. 87, 93-94 (2008).
6See Dan Farber, “The Possible Merits of a Hybrid Sales Plus
Carbon Tax,” Legal Planet (Oct. 9, 2012).
7Any border adjustments would have to be imprecise, but
the Supreme Court has been miserly about permitting an
approximately compensating tax to fall on imports to a state.
Steven Ferrey, “Goblets of Fire: Potentially Constitutional
Impediments to the Regulation of Global Warming,” 35 Ecology
L.Q. 835, 880-81 (2008) (doubting complementary tax doctrine
can save border adjustments), but see William Funk,
“Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade
Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
as a Case in Point,” 27 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 353, 366-68
(2009) (slightly more optimistic analysis).

We will argue that there are several routes by which a
properly designed carbon tax with border adjustments
might pass muster.8
Outline of a Carbon Tax
Although we will not be writing about the details
of carbon tax design, it is helpful to outline at least a
reasonable design of a carbon tax to set up our analysis.
Our outline here will roughly follow the carbon tax
design proposed by Gilbert Metcalf and David
Weisbach.
Most of the greenhouse gas produced in the United
States is produced by fossil fuels.9 Fossil fuel
production occurs via numerous chokepoints, such as
refineries, of which there are under 200 in the United
States.10 So, for simplicity, let us suppose that a state
were to impose a $20-per-metric-ton tax on carbon,
collected at refineries.11
That new tax would make exports from the taxing
state more expensive and imports to the state cheaper.
To illustrate, let us focus on a different concrete
example — concrete.12 The process of concrete
production produces carbon over and above the energy
that the production of concrete requires.13 There are
only a small number of concrete plants in the United
States, and thus concrete plants are a plausible point at
which a carbon tax might be imposed.
To be more specific, suppose that Oregon were to
impose a carbon tax of that sort. Without border tax
adjustments, Oregon would thereby significantly
disadvantage its domestic concrete producers — not

8Border adjustments imposed by a state would also likely
raise issues regarding international trade. Those issues will also
be beyond the scope of this article, though at least some
commentators plausibly see the issues as largely analogous and
thus perhaps a solution within the U.S. federal system might
suggest an answer internationally. Gergen supra; see also
generally Carol McAusland and Nouri Najjar, Carbon Footprint
Taxes, Section 5 (detailed discussion of WTO issues). Or
perhaps not. Indeed, if state border tax adjustments did cause
sufficient problems for the United States, they might be struck
down domestically as running afoul of the foreign dormant
commerce clause. Japan Lines v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434 (1979).
9Metcalf and Weisbach, supra note 5, at 522.
10Id. at 523.
11Note that according to the California Air Services Board’s
“Summary of Joint Action Settlement Prices and Results,” the
current price on the California exchange is $12.73. The oftquoted central estimate for the social cost of carbon will be $42
in 2020, according to the EPA fact sheet, Social Cost of Carbon.“
12With apologies for our bad attempts at punniness!
13Id. at 529-30 (”The emissions stem from the production of
clinker, an intermediate product, which is a combination of
lime and silica-containing materials. According to EPA, CO2
emissions from production are directly proportional to the lime
content of the clinker”).
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be riding to the rescue anytime soon, we must hope
that the states’ laboratories of democracy are up to the
task of saving the world.
And there is some reason to be hopeful that
subnational action could be significant. It appears that
the United States is on track to meet its pledges under
the Paris Agreement, even though the centerpiece of
former President Obama’s mitigation strategy, the
Clean Power Plan, has been held up in the courts and is
now unlikely, to put it mildly, to be a priority for the
Trump administration.3 How can that be so? One
reason is that the natural gas revolution has made coal
less cost effective. Another reason is that state
regulatory mandates have increased the use of
renewable energy.4
Carbon taxes pose numerous design issues.5 For
instance, should the tax be structured as a payment
made by consumers, as with retail sales taxes?6 Or
should the tax be structured as a levy imposed at
specific carbon-intensive choke points? We will mostly
abstract from those sorts of design issues in this article.
We will focus instead on analyzing whether the U.S.
Constitution, and in particular the judicially crafted
dormant commerce clause, prevents a state from
imposing border adjustments as part of a carbon tax.7
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14Compare Jenny H. Liu and Jeff Renfro, “Carbon Tax and
Shift: How to Make It Work for Oregon’s Economy,” Northwest
Economic Research Center Report 15 (2013), identifying the
problem.
15Metcalf and Weisbach, supra note 5, at 540-541. Note also
that a whole other issue is raised if the other state (or nation) is
trying to control carbon emissions but in a manner not directly
comparable — for example, California’s cap-and-trade system.
We will leave those questions to the side for the moment,
though note that the same basic analysis should apply should
one state try to unilaterally adjust its regime to cope with the
different carbon prices set by other jurisdictions (for example,
using an adjustable credit).
16This is an easy example; how would one strip out the
carbon tax from in-state services? That’s why it is important to
apply the tax at just a few points in which that kind of
calculation is at least roughly possible.

some type of border adjustment, could it impose one
that ultimately takes into account the origin of a good
or service? That is our second question.
To further illustrate this question, let’s return to our
Oregon concrete producer and suppose it is paying 1X
per unit in carbon taxes. Under those adjustments, an
out-of-state importer may need to pay 1.2X per unit —
or perhaps 0.9X — depending on the origin of the
concrete. As for out-of-state producers paying more,
that seems to be an even more blatant facial
discrimination.
Finally, our third question has to do with how
carbon intensity is being measured, as surely it is just
an approximation. That is, how much imprecision, if
any, is permissible?
So, to summarize, those are the three doctrinal
questions posed by border adjustments: (1) Can there
be any special tax at all on imports, even if it is the same
as a tax on domestic production? (2) Could a state
differentiate its border adjustments between products
based on approximations of their carbon intensity, if
such approximations take geography into account? (3)
Even if the answers to questions 1 and 2 are yes, how
much approximation is permissible?
Prima Facie Answers:
Border Adjustments Are Doomed
The U.S. Supreme Court imposes an almost per se
rule of invalidity about taxes that discriminate between
in-state and out-of-state taxpayers.17 Thus, the answer
to the second question, about applying different rates
to products based on the different carbon footprints of
different states or regions, seems very likely to be no.
That answer would then seem to be the end of the story,
whatever the answers to the other questions.18
Indeed, out-of-state producers seem necessarily to
be at a disadvantage to the extent that the border
adjustment takes into account the additional carbon
burned in transporting a product.
As to the first and third questions — can there be a
special import charge and how much imprecision is
permissible — the Court has tolerated special taxes on
imports (the use tax) only when they precisely matched
up with a tax on domestic consumption (the sales
tax).19 Because assessing the carbon intensity of both
17See, e.g., United Haulers Association Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer

Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 338-39 (2007).
18See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740
F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of
hearing en banc); see also Joseph Allan MacDougald, “Why
Climate Law Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence and State Greenhouse Gas Trading
Systems,” 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1431, 1435 (2008) (similar analysis).
19See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)
(Cardozo, J.).
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only in the export market but also in the state.14 This
disadvantage would manifest even if Oregon concrete
producers generated less greenhouse gases per unit of
concrete production than their out-of-state
competitors.15
That economic problem is both an environmental
problem and a political problem. Obviously, if more
expensive Oregon concrete is replaced by cheaper outof-state concrete that is made even cheaper because of
a lack of a carbon tax, the carbon tax will hurt Oregon
business and not reduce net carbon emissions. That
problem is called leakage. Naturally, the prospect of
economic harm suffered for no environmental gain is
likely to hurt the political prospects of any such reform
right from the start.
The direct fix for leakage is to credit the Oregon
producer for all the concrete that it is exporting and to
impose an equivalent tax on imports of concrete. In that
case, it is perhaps easy enough for Oregon to estimate
the carbon tax it has imposed on the concrete and to
strip it out, and also to add that cost to imports. The
Oregon concrete producer would then be charged a
per-unit tax on its concrete but would also get a refund
for the concrete it exported. A concrete importer would
then need to pay the same per unit cost when it imports
concrete.16
With that setup, we can now ask whether, seeing as
the tax described above would be specifically on
imports, would that tax not be a facial discrimination
under federal dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence? That is our first doctrinal question.
Then, assuming Oregon is to use border tax
adjustments, it will also need to use approximations
based on the origin of goods and services. That is, it is
likely cheaper to produce concrete in a state that has
cheaper — but (let us suppose) more carbon-intensive
— power sources. Assuming that Oregon could impose
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Our First Counterargument:
No Facial Discrimination Exists
In analyzing whether border tax adjustments
might be permissible, we first consider a recent
dormant commerce clause case about carbon
regulation — an important case that has received
surprisingly little attention from state tax
practitioners.21
As part of its implementation of A.B. 32,
California’s cap-and-trade regime, the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) adopted a low carbon fuel
standard. That standard sets an annual limit on the
carbon intensity of fuels, and blenders of fuels over the
limit must purchase credits from blenders below the
limit. To assess how a particular fuel did relative to the
standard, the CARB had to develop a complicated
metric that differentiated among fuels by region. The
rationale for differentiating among regions was that
there were differences in the carbon intensity of fuels
produced in different places. If California wanted its
system to actually reduce carbon, it had to rely on those
metrics.
A federal district court struck down the California
fuel standard. Among other reasons, and the key
reason for our purposes, the court found that taking
into account the source of fuels was a facial
discrimination that failed strict scrutiny.22
Nevertheless, a Ninth Circuit panel overturned the
district court by a 2-1 vote.23 The full Ninth Circuit then
refused to hear the case en banc.24
As to the facial discrimination argument, the
court’s majority reasoned that there was no facial
discrimination, because the California regulations were
not targeting out-of-state producers because they were
out of state; instead, the regulations were motivated by
20See Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641,

644 (1994).
21We found only one mention in State Tax Notes, in a column
by Patrick Dowdall. His general conclusions track ours. Patrick
Dowdall, ” Green Incentives and the Dormant Commerce
Clause,” State Tax Notes, Jan. 4, 2016, p. 41.
22Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 2011 WL
6936368 (E.D.Cal. Dec 29, 2011).
23Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 2013). Notably, the panel only overturned the case about
the facial constitutional challenge to the fuel standard, and thus
the standard may still be found wanting after a fact-intensive
analysis. That point was emphasized by the author of the Ninth
Circuit decision in his concurrence to the denial of the hearing
en banc. 740 F.3d at 510 (Gould, J., concurring).
24740 F.3d 507.

and based on an entirely different concern — namely,
measuring carbon intensity.25 Sometimes in-state
producers did better by that metric and sometimes
not.26 California was not basing its regulations on state
borders.
Interestingly, though that was not formally a tax
case, the decision revolved around several key
dormant commerce clause tax cases.27 Conceptually,
that makes sense because, as we have argued before,
regulations and taxes are often policy substitutes.28
Accordingly, although Supreme Court cases sometimes
seem to apply a different test to taxes versus
regulations, we know of no case in which the Court
said that there are different rules or justified there
being different rules.29 In any event, the Ninth Circuit,
in interpreting lead tax cases, seems to outline a
promising strategy for defending a carbon tax with
border adjustments, should it be properly designed
from the start. Specifically, the carbon intensity
framework should apply to all products and services.
So long as the regulatory structure is sufficiently
rigorous and based on factors other than jurisdictional
lines, it should pass muster even if some inputs take
geography into account.
Another important feature of the California
regulation is worth noting. The fuel standard generally
works by setting defaults and then allowing firms to
argue for individualized determinations.30 Thus, the
majority opinion noted that any mischief caused by the
general formulas — including to out-of-state producers
— could be corrected.31 The dissent did not believe that
those individualized determinations went far
enough.32 It is unclear how important that issue
ultimately was to the majority’s reasoning, but
25Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1089 (”The Fuel Standard

does not base its treatment on a fuel’s origin but on its carbon
intensity. The Fuel Standard performs lifecycle analysis to
measure the carbon intensity of all fuel pathways”). The dissent
disagreed with that characterization of the fuel standard. Rocky
Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1108 (Murguia, J. dissenting). This factual
dispute might be decisive in this case, but the doctrinal
argument would still stand that if a regulation truly did not
base itself on geography, it would not count as a facial
discrimination.
26Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1083-1084 (California ethanol
producers pay more because they import Midwestern corn).
27See, e.g., Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1089 (distinguishing
Oregon Waste).
28Gamage and Shanske, “On Tax Increase Limitations: Part
I — A Costly Incoherence,” State Tax Notes, Dec. 19, 2011, p. 813.
29See discussion here: Gamage and Shanske, “The Saga of
State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Reflections on the Colorado Decision,”
State Tax Notes, July 16, 2012, p. 197.
30Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1082.
31Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1094; 740 F.3d at 510 (Gould,

J., concurring).
32Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1109 (Murguia, J., dissenting).
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domestic and imported products will be the product of
informed guesswork, it seems such a practice would
not pass muster, either.20 Thus, the answer to the third
question is also likely no.
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permitting individual firms to challenge a default
seems to be a prudent feature should one wish to
design a system that would be upheld under the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning.33
Conclusion
We will explore additional doctrinal routes for
justifying well-designed border adjustments in our
next article in this series.34 For now, we conclude this
article by summarizing the theoretical reason why
border adjustments in the context of a subnational
carbon tax should not be struck down as per se
discrimination. A carbon tax is a tax on an externality,
but, because of leakage, the tax cannot succeed without
border adjustments. The courts have not considered a
tax like that, but we contend that current doctrine
points to a sensible way forward if a state chooses to
pursue it.


33By analogy, Gamage and Hicklin have argued that a
similar scheme — of a reasonable default that can be overcome
— should allow states to require remote vendors to collect use
taxes. David Gamage and Devin J. Heckman, “A Better Way
Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce,” 92 B.U. L. Rev. 483
(2012).
34If you just can’t wait, see Shanske, supra note 2, for a
preview.
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